

COLORADO North Central Region/ Denver Urban Area Security Initiative

Multi-Year Training & Exercise Plan

January 2020 - December 2023

Final Draft dated 11 March, 2021



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
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PREFACE

The Colorado North Central Region (NCR) and Denver Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) have agreed to follow a cooperative capability-based planning process consistent with the National Preparedness System. See Figure 1. This planning process allows the Region to use limited resources toward the most efficient and effective planning, training, equipping and exercising projects.

Figure 1: National Preparedness System Graphic

The National Preparedness System enables the whole community to integrate preparedness efforts to build, sustain, and deliver core capabilities that are in the greatest need of sustainment and improvement in order to achieve the National Preparedness Goal of a secure and resilient nation.



Once top risks have been determined through a risk assessment process and workshop, the 32 “core capabilities” as defined in the 2015 National Preparedness Goal, are assessed by subject matter expert committees. These assessments are used to determine what type of project(s) are necessary to close gaps. Using the POETE (Planning, Organization, Equipping, Training and Exercise) model to identify improvement solutions, the Region completes an Improvement Planning Workshop (IPW) and Training and Exercise Planning Workshop (TEPW) to determine where in the building block approach this capability requires corrective action. The outcome of these workshops and process are the Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (TEP) and Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA).

The Regional Training and Exercise Planning Workshop (TEPW) gave participants insight into the current risk, capabilities across the Region, and already planned training and exercise events for 2020 and 2021. The TEPW participants were tasked with reviewing the four planning, training and exercise building block series’ that span from 2020 to December 2023 - - Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack (CCTA), Cybersecurity, Bio Terrorism and Mass Care. The process during the workshop emphasized reviewing the planning gaps captured by small planning teams. The forward focus across these four scenarios is to ensure that plans and other procedures/policies will be in place before exercising to test the capability. The other purpose of the TEPW is to begin the planning and coordination between different series activities.

Throughout this document, the term Region and/or Regional is used to reflect the collective membership of the NCR and Denver Area UASI.

I. Purpose

The purpose of this Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (TEP) is to provide a region-wide roadmap to guide the Regional Training and Exercise Program. This plan will allow the Regional Training and Exercise Program to close identified gaps in core capabilities (2015 National Preparedness Goal) through planning, training and exercising series'. See Figure 2.

Included in this TEP is the training and exercise schedule forecast for each of the four risk scenarios and associated core capabilities. The intent of the schedule is to outline training and exercise events across the Region beyond those funded through grant programs. It is vital to coordinate and de-conflict events for cost savings, cost sharing and increased return on investment. Additionally, the schedule has considered real world planned events in order to avoid schedule interference.



Figure 2: Exercise Program Priorities Graphic

II. Training and Exercise Plan Methodology

The methodology used to establish this TEP includes a combination of the following:

- Training and Exercise Committee meetings to initiate TEPW planning discussions
- Review and analysis of exercise and real world event lessons learned within the Region
- Review and analysis of the capability and risk/threat assessments for the Region
- Completion of Regional THIRA/SPR processes to identify training gap areas across the Region/UASI
- Formation and development of small planning teams to develop and mature training and exercise series concepts/goals
- Planning meetings to determine which risks, associated core capabilities and planning scenarios will guide the TEPW and subsequent TEP
- Hold 2020 TEPW to review and confirm the outlined goals/objectives for each training and exercise series contained within the Regional TEP
- Review and concurrence of this TEP by the regional partners and membership of the Regional Training and Exercise Committee membership

- Adoption of the final draft TEP by the NCR Board of Directors and Denver UASI Working Group
- Identify and formally establish Training and Exercise Series Planning Teams to conduct planning meetings and other required T&E series activities. Planning meetings should occur regularly and remain as consistent as possible through the lifecycle of the entire training and exercise series project
- Exercise events will include a follow-on After Action Review (AAR) Meeting and AAR Report highlighting the improvement areas

III. Training and Exercise Program

The Regional Training and Exercise Program has been designed to meet the guidance of the National Preparedness Goal, National Preparedness System, Department of Homeland Security National Exercise Program, Colorado Homeland Security Strategy and the North Central Region Homeland Security Strategy.

The Training and Exercise Program priorities were agreed to and further refined by the TEPW attendees/participants. Each priority has a list of planned requirements that will be resourced and designed to close gaps in the associated core capabilities. Annex One outlines each series in a timeline, by quarter, consistent with a building block approach (Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2013 also see Figure 3).



Figure 3: Regional Building Block Approach

The Regional Training and Exercise Program is managed in coordination with stakeholders and partners across the North Central Region. Most training and exercise program series activities

described in this plan are contingent upon funding from the Homeland Security Grant Program and/or the Denver Area UASI. However, Regional staff will also strive to secure support through other sources of funding where possible. The Region has also regularly asked that local jurisdictions align their training and exercise calendars with these events to assist in building multi-jurisdictional competencies while minimizing costs. The Region will also strive to collaborate with State of Colorado agencies and private organizations in the areas that are appropriate and mutually beneficial.

The ultimate use of this plan is to provide a long range planning tool that will assist in synchronizing training and exercise activities across the NCR. In addition, the plan will support the justification for T&E funding for planning, training, and exercise activities in upcoming years. It is understood by all stakeholders that while this plan does not constitute a binding commitment, they should nonetheless attempt to align T&E efforts to accomplish the priorities jointly agreed upon.

A. PROGRAM PRIORITIES 2020-2023

1. Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Report (SPR) Training Gaps

Regional training and exercise planners have analyzed the results from the 2018 UASI THIRA and SPR to identify training gaps and requirements that need to be addressed within the 2020-2023 Regional Training and Exercise Plan. The primary method to address these gap areas is to request DHS/FEMA approved classes in order to build the baseline skills needed to improve gaps in core capabilities assessed with critical needs. These requests are considered to be a top priority for the UASI/Region based on the linkage to the identified UASI SPR gaps. The critical core capability areas and the requested classes are as follows:

<u>Core Capability</u>	<u>Requested DHS/FEMA Class</u>
Critical Transportation	MGT 412, Sport & Special Event Evacuation
Infrastructure	G-202, Debris Management Planning
Infrastructure	G-556, Local Damage Assessment
Logistics	L-675, Basic Interagency Logistics
Mass Care	G-418, Emergency Assistance Planning & Ops
Planning	MGT-346, EOC Ops & Plan for All Hazard Events
Planning	MGT-418, Training ID and Preparedness Planning
Public Info and Warning	G-290, Basic PIO
Public Info and Warning	G-291, JIS/Center Planning

While these are high priority training request/needs for the UASI/Region, specific delivery dates/times for these classes are dependent upon resource availability by DHS/FEMA contractors. Planning and delivery dates/times for these courses will also be closely

coordinated with the State of Colorado and local agencies to ensure the target training audiences will be effectively supported.

2. **Common Core Capabilities will be included in every planning, training and exercise series** because they continue to be identified as capability areas required improvement within Regional Capability Assessments and After Action Reports. Additionally, these three capabilities are associated with all risks, serve to unify the mission areas and are necessary for the success of the remaining core capabilities.
 - Operational Coordination
 - Public Information and Warning
 - Planning
3. **Cyber Attack (Infrastructure) Planning, Training and Exercise Series** will span from 2018-2022 given the severe planning, training and exercise deficiencies related to this top regional risk.
 - a. Associated Core Capabilities:
 - Cybersecurity
 - Mass Care
 - Critical Transportation
 - Situational Assessment
 - Information Sharing
 - Infrastructure Systems
 - Operational Communications
 - b. Identified Series Requirements:

CYs 2018 - 2019

COMPLETED ACTIVITIES

- Forensics and Planning Workshop (Q1 2018)
- Cyber Attack: Best Practice Playbooks Workshop (Q2 2018)
- Cyber Attack: Planning Workshop (Q3 2018)
- Regional Cyber Security Functional Exercise (Q1 2019)
- National Level Exercise Cyber Workshop (Q3 2019), 2 days and partially funded by DHS)

CY 2022

FUNDED EXERCISE 2018 GRANT (HSGP)

- Cyber Security Triage, Forensics and Planning Workshop (in partnership with CIS/MS-ISAC)
- Cyber Framework Workshop (Q4)

CY 2022

FUNDED TRAINING 2019 GRANT (UASI)

- End User Training (funding from 2018 & 2019 for delivery in 2022)
- Advanced Cyber Prevention Skills for IT Department Personnel: Block IP Addresses, best practice firewall settings, best practice network configuration, initial triage technical skills, early warning signs, sinkhole, routing, honeypot value (2 deliveries)

CY 2022

FUNDED EXERCISE 2020 GRANT (HSGP)

- Cyber Attack TTX and IPW (Q1 2022)
- Cyber Attack Incident Response Planning Workshop (Q3 2022)
- Cyber Attack Functional or Full Scale Exercise (Q4 2022)

4. Explosive Attack/Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Planning, Training and Exercise Series will begin in 2019 and will be completed in 2021.

a. Associated Core Capabilities:

- On-Scene Security and Law Enforcement
- Physical Protective Measures
- Mass Care
- Critical Transportation
- Situational Assessment
- Operational Communications
- Interdiction and Disruption
- Screen/Search/Detection
- Recovery

b. Identified Series Requirements:

CY 2020/21

FUNDED EXERCISE 2018 GRANT (HSGP)

- Active Shooter Quarterly TTX – 4 offerings one per quarter
- SA Tool Orientation Workshop (Q1, 2021)
- Regional Integrated Breaching Drills (Q2, 2021)
- Unified Command / Regional Coordination & Command TTX #1 (Q2, 2021)
- Investigation and Intelligence TTX (Q1, 2021)

CY 2021

TRAINING

- Advanced Shooting, Vehicle Engagement, Close quarter battle (Q2)
- Staging Area Manager/Staging Training – J-236 or equivalent (Q2)
- D-Co Leadership, Planning and Decision-Making (Q1)

EXERCISE

- Active Shooter Quarterly TTX – 4 offerings one per quarter
- Unified Command / Regional Coordination & Command TTX #2 (Q3)
- Full Scale Exercise/Capstone Event (Q4)
- Recovery Leadership TTX (Q4)

5. **Bioterrorism/Disease Outbreak Planning, Training and Exercise Series** will run from 2020-2022

- a. Associated Core Capabilities:
- Logistics and Supply Chain Management
 - Situational Assessment
 - Public Health, Medical and Emergency Medical Services
 - Operational Communications

b. Identified Series Requirements:

CY 2023

EXERCISE

- Regional Pandemic Flu TTX (Q2)
- Public Health/EPI TTX (Q3)
- Regional EPI TTX (Q3)
- Specimen Transport TTX (Q4)
- Alternate Care Workshop (Q4)

CY 2023

FUNDED TRAINING 2020 GRANT (HSGP)

- Cold Chain Management Training (Q2)
- BioWatch (PH Funds)
- PER-264 Law Enforcement Protective Measures for CBRNE
- AWR – 103 Crime Scene Management for CBRNE
- PER- 220 Emergency Response to Domestic Biological Incidents
- ICS – Position Specific Training (HCC Project)

FUNDED EXERCISE 2020 GRANT (HSGP)

- Legal Authorities & Implications Workshop (Q1)
- Disease Control Workshop (Q1)
- Public Health Law/Authorities Workshop (Q1)
- Hospital Staff Health & Safety Monitoring Workshop (Q1)
- Critical Information Sharing Workshop (Q2)
- Regional Plan Alignment Seminar (Q2)
- JIC Bioterrorism Related Messaging Workshop (Q2)
- EPI Involvement with Hospitals Workshop (Q3)
- JIC Region Wide Messaging Workshop (Q3)
- Hospital Surge Seminar (Q3)
- State Wide Public Health FSE (Q3-4) (no funding required)

- EM Systems / SA Tools Seminar (Q4)
- Supply Chain Allocation Workshop (Q4)
- Alternate Standards of dispatch/Care Response Workshop (Q4)

CY 2023

TRAINING

- Alternate Dispatch Standards Training (Q4)
- Risk Communications
- PER-264 Law Enforcement Protective Measures for CBRNE
- AWR – 103 Crime Scene Management for CBRNE
- PER- 220 Emergency Response to Domestic Biological Incidents
- ICS – Position Specific Training (HCC Project)

EXERCISE

- Multi-Jurisdictional Resource Coordination Workshop (Q1)
- EPI / Public Health Vaccination Planning Workshop (Q1)
- LE Isolation & Quarantine Workshop (Q1)
- Interdisciplinary Intervention Workshop (Q2)
- Patient Tracking of non-transported Patients Workshop (Q3)
- Staff Shortage Credentialing Seminar (Q3)
- Bio Terrorism FSE (Q4)

6. **Mass Care Training and Exercise Series** will run from 2020-2022

- a. Associated Core Capabilities:
 - Logistics and Supply Chain Management
 - Situational Assessment
 - Operational Coordination
 - Mass Care
- b. Identified Series Requirements:

CY 2023

FUNDED TRAINING 2020 GRANT (HSGP)

- Animal Shelter Class (American Humane) (Q3)
- Big Useful Livestock Lessons (Q4)

CY 2022-2023

TRAINING

- TBD

EXERCISE

- Multi-Jurisdictional Sheltering Coordination Workshop (Q1 2023)
- Capstone Exercise (Q3 2023)

B. REVIEW, CONCURRENCE, AND MODIFICATIONS

This TEP has been reviewed by the Regional Training and Exercise Planning Committee (TEPC) before being adopted by the NCR Board of Directors and UASI Working Group each year following the TEPW. The intent is for the annual plan to take effect in January of each calendar year.

It is important to note that the TEPC strives to support the guidelines of Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) for exercise program management, design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. Changes to the TEP will be reviewed and updated annually at the TEPW and submitted to the Regional governance bodies for adoption.

The TEPC is responsible for the implementation of the TEP. Changes to the TEP schedule and/or requirements may be required throughout the year as the plan is being executed. Changes should be made on a by exception basis, but the multi-year plan is a living document which should be adjusted when training or exercise requirements or schedule dictate a change.

The TEPC will evaluate and implement any required changes as deemed necessary during their normal meeting schedule. For more significant changes or issues, the TEPC may request that the NCR Board and UASI Working Group review and make the decision as the governing bodies.

The TEPC Chairs will update the governance bodies on any changes to the schedule and/or requirements at the following scheduled board meeting.

C. PROGRAM SUCCESS

Carrying out a successful Regional Training and Exercise Program requires that jurisdictions throughout the Region participate and support the same goals and preparedness mission. A successful training and exercise program must be integrated into overall preparedness efforts and evaluation and improvement should be built into planning, training, equipping and exercising efforts to assure sustainability. **Most importantly, the training and exercise program and its events should be understood, agreed upon, and supported by leadership across the region.**

The NCR and Denver UASI are partners for a region-wide prioritization approach to preparedness. A committee structure is utilized with a representative population of experts in the field of emergency preparedness, management, and response to assess gaps and identify needs. The TEPC holds the overall responsibility for the implementation of a successful Regional Training and Exercise Program. Additionally, other regional committees are the conduit to identifying training and exercise needs within their work plans. These committees are invited and highly encouraged to come to the TEPW prepared to assist in the discussions and prioritization of events.

D. NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

Exercise program management involves a collaborative approach that integrates resources, organizations, and individuals in order to identify and achieve program priorities. Through the management of an exercise program, stakeholders provide oversight to specific training and exercise activities sustained over time. An effective exercise program maximizes efficiency, resources, time, and funding by ensuring that exercises are part of a coordinated and integrated approach to building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities.

Key elements of HSEEP's approach to exercise program management include:

- **Engaging Elected and Appointed Officials to Provide Intent and Direction.** Elected and appointed officials must be engaged early and often in an exercise program. They provide both the strategic direction for the program as well as specific guidance for individual exercises. Routine engagement with elected and appointed officials ensures that exercises have the support necessary for success.

- **Establishing Multi-year Exercise Program Priorities.** These overarching priorities inform the development of exercise objectives, ensuring that individual exercises evaluate and assess core capabilities in a coordinated and integrated fashion.
- **Using a Progressive Approach.** A progressive exercise program management approach includes exercises anchored to a common set of objectives, built toward an increasing level of complexity over time, and involves the participation of multiple entities.
- **Developing a Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan.** A TEP, developed through a TEPW, aligns exercise activities and supporting training to exercise program priorities.
- **Maintaining a Rolling Summary of Exercise Outcomes.** A rolling summary report provides elected and appointed officials and other stakeholders with an analysis of issues, trends, and key outcomes from all exercises conducted as part of the exercise program.
- **Managing Exercise Program Resources.** An effective exercise program utilizes the full range of available resources for exercise budgets, program staffing, and other resources.

E. PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM

The Region uses a progressive planning, training, and exercise methodology. This is a series of planning, training, and exercises tied to a set of common program priorities. Planning gaps will be filled prior to training and operations-based exercises. Each exercise builds on previous exercises using more sophisticated simulation techniques or requiring more preparation time, personnel, and planning. Principle Objectives or series objectives are critical and high level functions, missions, and priorities across the region. These terms are consistent with the Federal Emergency Management Agency Exercise Program. Each series will be managed by a planning team and have consistent meetings to manage each step of the series including planning, training, and exercise components or events.

IV. Multi-Year Program Schedule

A. PROGRAM AND SCHEDULE

Annex One of this plan illustrates the current calendar for planned and anticipated Region-wide training and exercise activities from January 2020 to December 2023. This schedule is intended to capture the Region's desire for a progressive increase in planning, training and exercise complexity over the course of the next four years and focusing on four series'. This progressive exercise cycle is anchored to risk, core capabilities and principal objectives.

V. Evaluations

A. GOAL OF EVALUTION

To get the maximum benefit from an exercise or training event, there should be a plan or procedure that is the basis of this activity. Planners and evaluators must look at the content of the course as it relates to the plan or procedure or, if it is an exercise, how participants implemented existing plans and made decisions in response to the exercise events. Training evaluations should determine if the course effectively met the identified training gap. Exercise evaluations should focus on positive outcomes as well as areas for improvement. Evaluation results should be reviewed by the participating agencies and jurisdictions as an opportunity to identify ways to build on strengths and bridge capability gaps. Lessons learned, improvement plans, and positive outcomes will be shared with others in the Region for internal consideration in building their plans and procedures. Because planning and conducting an exercise requires a significant commitment of resources, it is important to maximize the benefits gained from the exercise through the evaluation and improvement process.

Most importantly, the after action reports and improvement plans should be understood, agreed upon, and supported by leadership across the region.

The goal of exercise evaluation is to validate strengths and identify improvement opportunities for the participating organization(s). This is accomplished by: observing the exercise and collecting supporting data; analyzing the data to compare performance against expected outcomes; and determining what changes need to be made to procedures, plans, staffing, equipment, organizations, and inter-agency coordination. The focus of the evaluation for tabletops and other discussion-based exercises is on plans, policies, and interagency/inter-jurisdictional relationships, whereas the focus of operations-based exercises is on assessing performance within the homeland security mission areas.

B. EVALUATION TO IMPROVE CAPABILITY

1. After Action Reports (AARs).

An AAR provides a description of what happened during the exercise, issues that need to be addressed, and recommendations for improvement. AARs will be developed using the suggested format of HSEEP.

2. Improvement Plans (IPs).

The IP is the means by which the lessons learned from the exercise are turned into concrete, measurable capability gaps. When the IP is complete, it specifically details what actions will be taken to address each recommendation presented in the draft AAR, who or what agency(ies) will be responsible for taking the action, and the timeline for completion. When each listed item is completed within the IP, the result is improved gap for that capability area. The IP should be realistic and should establish priorities for the use of limited resources. Every effort should be made to address recommendations related to performance of critical tasks. Other recommendations should also be addressed, as appropriate. When the availability of resources may not be immediate, short-term and long-term solutions should be discussed.

IPs can serve as the basis for future needs assessments and budgets. If the recommendation in the IP identifies the need to improve a capability then the jurisdiction could establish a short-term solution and look at future budgets and other resources for the long-term goal.

C. SHARING LESSONS LEARNED

The goals and benefits of sharing the AAR/IP:

- 1) The AAR/IP provides a method for collecting information about corrective actions. Identified needs for action can be integrated into the annual regional planning cycle and considerations for resource allocation.
- 3) The Region will upload After-Action Reports, Improvement Plans, Good Stories, and/or Lessons Learned, as approved, onto the secure portion of the Regional website (www.ncrcolorado.org). These documents can be securely viewed by others in the field of homeland security. The Region will also upload the approved and adopted training and exercise plan on the same site.

D. ROLLING SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES

To help ensure the training and exercise program priorities are adequately addressed, the program managers will annually develop and distribute a rolling summary of outcomes (See Annex Two). A rolling summary report provides stakeholders with an integrated analysis of issues, trends, and key outcomes from all exercises conducted as part of the exercise program as well as real world events that have taken place.

This report is designed to:

- Inform elected and appointed officials on the progress of the exercise program;

- Provide data to support preparedness assessments and reporting requirements; and
- Enable exercise planners to modify objectives and the exercise schedule to reflect knowledge gathered from the exercises.

The rolling summary report is not a collection of AARs, but rather an analysis of trends across exercises and real world incidents. It is developed periodically throughout the series of exercises covered in a multi-year TEP.

ANNEX ONE

Training and Exercise Schedule January 2021 -December 2024

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

Year	Qtr	Series	Training	Exercise	Committee	Resource
2021	Q1	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Active Shooter Quarterly TTX	Incident Ops	NCR 2018
2021	Q1	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Region Coordination Workshop	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q1	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield GIS/SA Tool Orientation Workshop	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q1	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Investigations and Intelligence Workshop	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q2	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Region - TTX #1	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q2	CCTA/E	MGT-412 Sport & Special Event Evacuation		Incident Ops	No Cost – Hosted by Coors Field
2021	Q2	CCTA/E	Operation Mountain Shield Staging Area Manager/training J-236 or equivalent		Incident Ops	UASI 2019
2021	Q2	CCTA/E	Operation Mountain Shield, D-Co Leadership, Planning, and Decision-making		Incident Ops	UASI 2019
2021	Q2	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Active Shooter Quarterly TTX	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q2	All		NCR Burn Surge Workshop	PH	HCC/No Regional funds

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

2021	Q2	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Regional Framework Workshop	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q2	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield. Regional Integrated Breaching Drills	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q3	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Active Shooter Quarterly TTX	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q3	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Regional - TTX #2	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q3		Shelter Management Course (Red Cross)		Mass Care	No cost
2021	Q3		CART Training		Mass Care	No cost
2021	Q3		CDBG-DR Overview (At Mass Care Committee Meeting)		Mass Care	No Cost –
2021	Q4	CCTA/E		Operation Mountain Shield Capstone Full Scale Exercise	Incident Ops	NCR 2019
2021	Q4		Shelter Management Course (Red Cross)		Mass Care	No cost
2021	Q4		VOAD Workshop		Mass Care	No cost
2021	Q4		Human Services Seminar			No cost
2021	Q4		Sex Offender Training (At Mass Care Committee Meeting)		Mass Care	No cost -
2021	Q4	All		Regional IPPW	NCR/UASI	NCR 2020

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

Year	Qtr	Series	Training	Exercise	Committee	Resource
2022	Q1	CCTA		Operation Mountain Shield Recovery Leadership TTX	NCR	NCR 2019
2022	Q1		American Humane Shelter Class		Mass Care	NCR 2020
2022	Q1		Shelter Management Course (Red Cross)		Mass Care	No cost
2022	Q1		CART Training		Mass Care	No cost
2022	Q1		Understanding Legal Authority/Legal Housing Authority Rules (At Mass Care Committee Meeting)		Mass Care	No cost
2022	Q1		Stars and Bars Executive Leadership Command Session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q1		80 Hour HazMat Technician Training Course		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q1	Cyber		Cyber Incident Response Planning Workshop	Cyber	NCR 2020
2022	Q1	Cyber		Cyber Attack TTX & IPW	Cyber	NCR 2020

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

2022	Q2	Cyber	Advanced Cyber Prevention Skills		Cyber	UASI 2019
2022	Q2	Cyber		ICS for Cyber Security Scenario Workshop	Cyber	NCR - No Funding Requirement
2022	Q2		Team Maneuver Tactics - 5 day session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q2		Tactical Command Course - 5 Day Session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q2		Towed Junk Vehicle for live fire VEC		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q2		80 Hour HazMat Technician Training Course		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q2		Big Useful Livestock Lessons (BULL)		Mass Care	NCR 2020
2022	Q2		Shelter Management Course (RC)		Mass Care	No cost
2022	Q2		ESF 11 Training		Mass Care	No cost
2022	Q2		Post-disaster rebuilding (At Mass Care Committee Meeting)		Mass Care	No cost
2022	Q3		Advanced Critical Engagement Course - 2 Day Session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q3		Vehicular Engagement Course - 2 Day Session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

2022	Q3		Pistol Performance Accuracy Course - 2 Day Session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q3		Carbine Performance Accuracy Course (CPAC) - 2 Day Session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q3		NFPA Collapse Technician Training		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q3		80 Hour HazMat Technician Training Course		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q3	Cyber		Triage, Forensics & Planning Workshop (with MS-ISAC SMEs)	Cyber	NCR 2019
2022	Q4	Cyber	Advanced Cyber Prevention Skills		Cyber	UASI 2019
2022	Q4	Cyber		ICS for Cyber Security Scenario Workshop	Cyber	NCR - No Funding Requirement
2022	Q4	All		Regional IPPW	NCR/UASI	NCR 2020
2022	Q4		Stars and Bars Executive Leadership Command Session		Incident Ops	Proposed 2021 UASI funds
2022	Q4	Cyber		Cyber Attack Functional Exercise	Cyber	NCR 2020

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

Year	Qtr	Series	Training	Exercise	Committee	Resource
2023	Q1	Bio		Public health Law/Authorities: TTX/Workshop	PH	Hosted by Tri-County Health
2023	Q1	Bio		Emerging Pathogens, Ebola JIC/JIS Full Scale	PH	CDPHE/no Regional funds
2023	Q1	Bio		NCR HCC Regional Response Plan Workshop/TTX	PH	HCC/No Regional funds
2023	Q1	Bio		Regional Coalition Surge Test	PH	HCC/No Regional funds
2023	Q1	Bio	Risk Communications Training		Unknown at this time	No funds needed
2023	Q1	Bio		Legal Authorities and Implications: 2 day workshop	PH	NCR 2020
2023	Q1	Bio		Hospital Staff Health and Safety/Monitoring Workshop	Healthcare	NCR 2020
2023	Q1	Bio		Command & Coordination Multi-Jurisdictional Agency/Resource Workshop/TTX	PH	Proposed 2022 REQUEST
2023	Q1	Bio		Epi/Public Health Ring Vaccination Planning workshop	PH	Proposed 2022 REQUEST

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

023	Q1	Bio		LE Isolation & Quarantine Training/Drills	PH	Proposed 2022 REQUEST
2023	Q1		Behavioural Animal Motivarots (BAM) training		Mass Care	Proposed 2021 NCR Resources
2023	Q1		Hazwoper for animal responders and animal decontamination training (30 attendees)		Mass Care	Proposed 2021 NCR Resources
2023	Q2		ESF 11 Training		Mass Care	No funds needed
2023	Q2	Bio		NCR Pediatric Surge Annex TTX	PH & EMS	NCR HCC Funded
2023	Q2	Bio		Emerging Pathogens, Ebola Full Scale Exercise	PH	CDPHE & LPHA Funded
2023	Q2	Bio		Hospital Pharmacist Seminar & Recorded Webinar	Healthcare	NCR 2020
2023	Q2	Bio		Public Health Monitoring of First Responders/Health and Safety Summit	PH	NCR 2020

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

2023	Q2	Bio		Critical Information Sharing TTX: First Responders and First Receivers	PH & Healthcare	NCR 2020
2023	Q2	Bio	Cold Chain Management Training		Fatality Management	NCR 2020
2023	Q2	Bio		Regional Plan Alignment Seminar	PH & Healthcare	NCR 2020
2023	Q2	Bio		Joint Information Center Bioterrorism Related Messaging Workshop	PH & Healthcare	NCR 2020
2023	Q2	Bio		Crisis Standards of Care Follow Up TTX	PH	Proposed 2021 REQUEST
2023	Q2	Bio		Interdisciplinary Non-Pharmaceutical Intervention Workshop	PH & Healthcare	Proposed 2021 REQUEST
2023	Q2	Bio	Alternate Dispatch Standards Training		PH	Proposed 2021 REQUEST
2023	Q2	Bio		Staff Shortage Strategies and Credentialing Seminar	PH & Healthcare	Proposed 2021 REQUEST

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

2023	Q2	Bio		Regional Pandemic Flu TTX	PH	NCR HCC & LPHA Funded
2023	Q2	Bio		NCR HCC Regional Response Plan TTX	PH & EM	NCR HCC Funded
2023	Q2	All		NCR Pediatric Surge Annex TTX	PH	HCC/No Regional funds
2023	Q3		American Humane Shelter Class		Mass Care	Proposed 2021 NCR Resources
2023	Q3		Big Useful Livestock Lessons (BULL)		Mass Care	Proposed 2021 NCR Resources
2023	Q3	Bio		Hospital Surge Seminar	PH & Healthcare	NCR HCC Funded
2023	Q3	Bio	Clinical Skills		HCC	HCC Funds
2023	Q3	Bio	MGT-319 Medical Countermeasures		NCR/UASI	Region will coordinate
2023	Q3	Bio		Public Health/Epi TTX: Identification, Reporting and Notification to Partners - Including Regional Epi network	PH	NCR HCC/LPHA Funded
2023	Q3	Bio		Epi Integration with Hospitals: Workshop	PH & Healthcare	NCR 2020

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

2023	Q3	Bio		Crisis Standards of Care TTX	PH & Healthcare	NCR 2020
2023	Q3	Bio		Alternate Care Site/Facility TTX	PH & Healthcare	NCR 2020
2023	Q3	Bio		Patient Tracking Workshop	EMS & Healthcare	Proposed 2021 REQUEST
2023	Q3	Bio		Capstone Exercise	PH	Proposed 2021 REQUEST
2023	Q3-Q4	Bio		State-wide Public Health FSE	CDPHE	CDPHE/no regional funds required
2023	Q4	Bio		Specimen Transport (CDPHE Lab) Workshop/ TTX	PH & Healthcare	NCR HCC & LPHA Funded
2023	Q4		CART Training		Mass Care	No funds needed
2023	Q4		ESF 11 Training		Mass Care	No funds needed
2023	Q4	Bio		Alternate Care Workshop	PH	NCR HCC & LPHA Funded
2023	Q4	Bio	PER-267 Emergency Med Ops for CBRNE		NCR/UASI	No funds/UASI Coordinates
2023	Q4	Bio		State-wide Public Health Pan Flu Functional Exercise	CDPHE	CDPHE/no regional funds
2023	Q4	Bio		Public Health Monitoring of First Responders TTX	PH	NCR 2020

REGIONAL MULTI-YEAR TRAINING AND EXERCISE PLAN

2023	Q4	Bio		EM Systems / Situational Awareness Tools Seminar	CDPHE & NCR	NCR 2020
2023	Q4	Bio		Supply Chain Allocation Workshop	PH	NCR 2020
2023	Q4	Bio		Public Safety/Responder Alternation Standards of Dispatch/Care Response Workshop	PH	NCR 2020

ANNEX TWO

Regional Lessons Learned Rolling Summary Report

Last Updated January 2020

2020 Regional Lessons Learned

Rolling Summary Report

POETE:

**Used to determine the type of resolution methodologies. P=Planning
O=Organizational Change Eq=Equipment
T=Training E=Exercise**



Report includes findings from the following exercises:

(Please reference the appropriate AAR for more information)

2009	Vigilant Front Range FSE (VFR)
2010-11	Operation Mountain Guardian Series/FSE (OMG)
2012	Lower North Fork Commission AAR (LNF)
2012-13	Operation Vortex Tornado Series/FSE (Vortex)
2012	Englewood Active Shooter FSE – (Englewood AS)
2013	Boulder County Flood AAR (Boulder Flood)
2014	Operation Mountain SYNC Drills (OMS)
2014	Broken Arrow FSE (Broken Arrow)
2014	Aurora Theater AAR (Aurora Theater)
2014	Tri-County ESF 8 and EMS TTX (Tri-County TTX)
2015	Operation Buffalo Shield Active Shooter FSE (OBS)
2015	Operation Fall Storm Active Shooter FSE (OFS)
2015	Adams County Operation CHAOS FE (CHAOS)
2015-16	Regional Wildland Fire Series/FSE (WFE)
2016	Regional Mass Fatality TTX (MF)
2016	Operation Golden Ladder Drills (OGL)
2016	Regional Cyber Security TTX (CS)
2017	Regional Decontamination Drills (RDDs)
2017	Denver Active Threat Preparedness TTX (DAT)
2017	Denver BioWatch (IP completed/bio series 2021)
2017	Regional Breaching/Hostage Rescue Drills (Breach)
2017	Regional Active Shooter TTXs (AS TTXs)
2017-2018	Regional Cyber Attack Series (CAS)
2018	Regional Disaster Assistance Workshop (DAW)
2019	Cybersecurity Functional Exercise (CFE)
2019	Bomb Cyclone AAR (BC)
2019	Morgue Surge Operations TTX (MSO)

A. OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. (OMG) **Radio users are still using 10-codes** to communicate and should adhere to plain talk instead of using 10-codes when using tactical radios. Use of plain language is even more important in multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional events. In addition, the use of plain language will contribute to the development of a common operating picture for dispatch centers and emergency operation centers who are working to effectively resource the response effort. **T/E**
2. (Vortex/VFR/OMG/OMS/Aurora Theater AAR/AS TTX) **Regional Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) was not well followed or known.** Incident personnel did not adequately address radio channel assignments in the ICS 205, nor did they adequately discuss the communications plan during the shift change briefing. Operating in a vacuum, field personnel self-assigned radio frequencies, which then had to be changed when formal channel assignments were disseminated. *Aurora Theater AAR- volume of radio traffic hindered messaging (not received or not understood)* **T/E** (AS TTX) Very few participants knew of or use the TICP/FOG.
3. (Vortex/VFR/CHAOS) **It is important to establish communications with emergency operations center multi-agency coordinating center (EOC/MACC), dispatch center, and responding units.** Pre-disaster/emergency contact lists and communications plans should be coordinated and agreed upon by regions and jurisdictions in advance and exercised regularly. Establish a Communications Unit in the Logistics Section. Direct this unit to prepare an Incident Radio Communications Plan (FEMA-ICS Form 205) in the initial phase of an emergency response. Ensure that this plan provides specific incident radio frequency assignments for the duration of the emergency, identifies all assigned radio frequencies, and delineates communications assignments for the operation elements identified on the Incident Organization Chart (FEMA-ICS Form 201/207) and the Incident Organization Assignment List (FEMA-ICS 203). Communications plan was not developed and should consider adding EOCs at the county and municipality level. **T/E**
4. (Vortex/OGL) **Inadequate number of radios in working condition** within hospitals hindered communications within hospitals. Additionally other critical external nodes in the region need to be able to communicate with the EOCs. In OGL, radios across the NCR were **not all programmed correctly including just in time cache radios.** **(Radio maintenance & programming)**
5. (OMG) **Interoperable communications capabilities for EMS and Medical support agencies did not function effectively.** Communications, both technical arrangements and information management arrangements, degraded the medical branch operations. Additionally, the only way to communicate with the private ambulance companies on scene was verbal/face to face. Policy and procedures need to be developed in order to improve the capability for government agencies to communicate with private ambulance companies. **P/T/E**
6. (OMG) The communications system and trained Communication Unit Leaders are available for Incident Commanders to utilize. **Command must understand the strengths associated with the COML resources** within the Region and become comfortable with utilizing these resources during actual events and responses. **T/E**
7. (VFR) Radio dispatch was **saturated with more radio traffic than one talk group could manage.** In the future, split operations into multiple talk groups by specific need. Identify a command officer that will

monitor the talk group to maintain information flow. Practice this reconfiguration of talk groups to validate if it will work. **T/E**

8. (VFR) There were **difficulties communicating with helicopters**. The communications suite on the helicopters needs to be fixed and/or upgraded. **Eq/T/E**
9. (VFR) **Decentralized dispatch plans and procedures need to be better communicated** to partner agencies. Provide training and information on the new plans and procedures to partner response agencies. Continue to train and exercise with dispatch. **T/E**
10. (VFR) **Radio traffic between military and outside partners does not exist other than telephone**. Research the possibility of a gateway solution in Network First. All agencies need to establish common frequencies and train to these. Possibly purchase radios for the EOC and MEOC that operate at the 800 MHz range. Possibly recruit ARES to assist. **P/Eq/T**
11. (OMS/Broken Arrow) **Fire and EMS need a channel of their own to improve response**. Broken Arrow - Strike teams should have pre designated intra-team frequency for communication. (working on EMS green channel) **P/T/E**
12. (CHAOS) **ARES capabilities not well-known across county responders**. **T/E**
13. (OGL/OBS) **Responders should ensure information related to “the scene” is relayed on radios continuously** (number of victims, locations specifics, people, shooter(s), noise, smells, teams inside, secure locations, and who is securing each location). This allows outside agencies and incoming resources to be aware of the dynamic situation and status continuously. **Supervisors may want to carry an extra radio** to allow the ICP to hear more than one channel at a time (fire agencies often do this). **P/Eq/T/E**
14. (BC) **Creation of more pre-event messaging might be helpful**. More specifically, **advanced preparedness information**, messaging regarding response time expectation, inability to tow cars, the fact individuals will be taken to shelters and not home, and perhaps pre-established information about tow-lots and how to retrieve cars that were stuck, tow-fees if for towing after the fact, etc. Having this information might also help people feel more comfortable about leaving cars. **A clear process for notification of command and emergency operations center activations including information sharing platforms utilized by all partners should be developed and utilized**. Delay in public awareness and messaging. Although news was sharing details, **the message from law enforcement to stay off the roads was not made until later**. In addition, it was not made clear where the Arapahoe County shelters were located. **P/O**
15. (BC) There were **significant difficulties tracking where rescued individuals were pulled from and where their cars were taken**, which makes it challenging giving them the right information after the storm on how to get their car. **P/O/T/E**
16. (BC) There is a need for future work with **exercising and discussing considerations of a JIC and messaging coordination regionally**. **P/T/E**
17. (BC) **ARES resources could have been pre-staged in order to be utilized more quickly and effectively**. Pre-staging would have increased response capability, response time, and would have avoided any response challenges given the storm. **P/O**
18. (BC) **Communications and Engagement Dept. staff could be easily overwhelmed with volume of calls resulting from the activation of the Call Center** **P/O/Eq/T/E**

19. (BC) OEM was unable to get reception for the designated OEM incident coordination channels on the portable 700/800 MHz radios within the government center, which **severely limited inter-agency communication capabilities**. O/Eq

B. OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

1. MANAGEMENT/POLICIES/LEADERSHIP:

- a. (OMG and Vortex) **Multi-jurisdictional plans, policies and procedures** are not fully developed enough to be evaluated in exercises. The region is actively developing a resource plan for multi-agency coordination and prioritization. These are to be tested in Operation Vortex. Vortex – Plans were not completed either. **Unified coordination system - Multi-jurisdictional plans, policies and procedures are not fully developed** enough to be evaluated in exercises. The region is actively developing a resource plan for multi-agency coordination and prioritization. This is the second exercise series over a span of three years that this has been in the development phase. Recommend a working group to proactively insist this improvement be implemented whether it is at a state or jurisdictional level. **Jurisdictions can mutually benefit in several ways when they choose to participate in multi-jurisdictional planning processes.** This process enables comprehensive approaches to mitigation of hazards that affect multiple jurisdictions; allows economies to scale by leveraging individual capabilities; sharing costs/resources; avoids duplication of efforts; and encourages external disciplines into the process. Continue to build relationships in regional committees. P/O/T/E
- b. (OMG/OGL/OFS) Newer **First Responders lacked confidence** in site management and scene security with these types of atypical threats (**terrorist tactics/active shooter**). Additionally, responders should train and exercise in assessing these types of non-traditional problems in order to develop confidence in management and securing these types of events. T/E
- c. (VFR and OMG) Varying agency policies and procedures utilized in tactical response operations exposed potential **force protection gaps**. Regional member agencies should consider the development of common policies and procedures that further force protection operations. Updated policies will assist in filling the identified scene safety and security gaps observed during the exercise. T/E
- d. (OMG and OMS) **Additional effort is required to develop agreed upon policies and procedures when incidences are across multiple jurisdictions or mutual aid** resources are utilized. OMS-policies and procedures are more closely related when responding to active shooter situations but still work to be done. P/T/E
- e. (OMG) Lack of integration of emergency medical services into the incident command structure resulted in many exercise victims untreated for well past the standard of care. Development of a patient dispersal/force protection policy is a high priority area for the Region to address. **EMS should focus on policies and procedures that allow victims to be rescued/treated within a short time frame.** Planning has been conducted and continue T/E
- f. (OGL) There is an immediate need to **improve leadership skills and confidence across middle management within the public safety and first responder community**. The response to an active threat situation vastly improves when a single first responder assumes the leadership role regardless of rank or department size to start coordinating into an IC structure. Response times in getting victims extracted were cut in half when leadership developed a plan and assigned roles to accomplish the plan. (see full report) T/E

- g. (AS TTXs) Adoption, training, and usage of multiple regional/sub-regional plans is not completely uniform across the region (progress is being made). Very few participants knew of or use the TICP/FOG, use of GRGs is limited, and SOG's are not adopted throughout the entire region. **P/T/E**
- h. (BC) **Need to give thought to how road closures are done, as they are not typically effective.** Motorists only drive cars to lesser used, lesser cared for roads that are in even worse shape (sometimes guided by online mapping apps). Hard closures are hard to carry out as well, as dispatching equipment to close roads is often unfeasible. **P/O**
- i. (BC) As towing private vehicles with county vehicles often poses a liability risk, providing some sort of **disclaimer regarding vehicle damage might decrease county post-incident liability.** **P/O**
- j. (BC) **Fueling was a challenge for vehicles from many agencies.** Many of the fueling stations were closed or difficult to get to. It took a bit of time to get a fuel truck out to vehicles. This also caused financial concerns as to who was and wasn't getting fuel paid for by the County. **Eq**
- k. (BC) **Areas without snow fencing created substantial problems** – snow completely blocked roads. Regular plows could not get through the sometimes 8 foot drifts. In areas with snow fencing the pavement was barely covered with snow. **P/O/Eq**
- l. (BC) **Road and Bridge operators were not available to assist in life safety missions.** Staff were following existing procedures to plow priority routes – there is no clause for changing this priority within their existing procedures. **P/Eq**
- m. (BC) Currently, **no written plans or policies exist to share staff among departments**, specifically to augment the Streets Dept. during storm events **P/O**
- n. (BC) **Triggers need to be identified** for the Colorado Air and Space Port on closures. The decision to remain open in spite of closing all other government buildings, and then subsequently deciding to close as well, created confusion. Emails were sent throughout the event to the JCPH Directors and the PHIMT for situational awareness. However, there are no written 'trigger points' or processes in place for different activation levels in the ESF 8 Plan for when this information should be sent. It was discussed in the hot wash that if an increase in resource requests occur, then the increase in requests could potentially be a 'trigger point.' In addition, there are no written 'trigger points' or processes, or templates in place for different activation levels in the ESF 8 Plan for when activation notification should be sent to the NCR-PH. Trigger/decision points for requesting and activating shelter/warming center not consistent across EM agencies. **P/O/T/E**
- o. (BC) **Connections and coordination with utility providers was not strong.** In most cases, EMs relied on public facing websites to gather information. **P/O/T/E**
- p. (BC) There is a need to figure out the problem of people going around **road closures and getting stuck on secondary routes.** Roads became very congested with stranded vehicles making it difficult to maintain snow removal efforts **P/O**
- q. (BC) **Risk Management Documentation:** During the event, a vehicle was crashed. There was no relevant pass on or documentation of the crash. **P/O/T/E**

2. COMMAND AND CONTROL:

- a. (OMG/Vortex/VFR/OMS/Broken Arrow/Aurora Theater/OBS/OFS/Boulder Flood) Basic incident command structures are understood by all: however **establishment of an actual unified command, operations and planning, effort must be a part of future training and exercises.** Agencies require training to truly unify command, operations and planning so that the entire response is aware of the common objectives and all are working toward those goals.

Training on how to organize an operational response in a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency scenario must continue and include the conceptual use of divisions and branches. Expanding our capability to manage these types of emergencies at the command level should be a priority training and exercise objectives. It is strongly advised that the entities conduct training on ICS, specifically unity of effort, unified command, span of control, operations and planning. Continue to conduct training and exercise unified command in multi-disciplinary environment. Note that in VFR it was suggested that these structures include the military responders as well.

Broken Arrow - Some of the basic ICS positions were utilized but no real organized team.

Boulder Flood-Additional staff training on ICS especially Area Command and principles of ICS.

Aurora Theater - There was a failure of police and fire officials to establish a single unified command within an hour after the shooting. Also led to secondary issues of radio traffic overload, duplication of requests, and no control or prioritization of EMS resources.

OBS-Roles and responsibilities were not always clear in unified command. T/E

- b. (Boulder Flood) **No clear incident objectives articulated to branches/line level.** Incident objectives were developed by the IMT and not relayed to line level until a planning section was formalized in the 5th operational period. T/E
- c. (CHAOS) **ICS expanded to accommodate UC, containing representatives from many of the participating entities which may have hindered quick decision-making, exceeded span of control and overwhelmed ICP.** Agency “ICs” were engaging in operational level tasks and decisions, and were less accountable to UC responsibilities. T/E
- d. (OGL) **Law enforcement tend to have span of control issues** which is exacerbated when reaching across jurisdictional boundaries. For example, one officer may have 10-15 people reporting to him or her instead of assigning someone to be in charge of directing a few in team formation. The potential cause of this could be that law enforcement personnel are reluctant in assigning roles and responsibilities outside their jurisdiction even when the other agency is in their jurisdiction. T/E
- e. (MF) There was **not a definite command, control or coordination structure** that could be articulated or understood during the exercise. P/T/E
- f. (MF) Coroner’s offices do not understand how to order resources when ESF 8 is activated, DOCs are operational and EOCs are operational. **Confusion due to lack of clear planning between public health and emergency management.** P/T/E
- g. (RDDs) Hazmat teams should practice organizing into an **initial effective incident command structure.** At times, it slowed operations and made uneven workload balances among some responders. T/E
- h. (CAS) Regional partners have identified **the immediate need for additional incident command system (ICS) training for personnel that would respond to a cyber-security incident.** T/E

3. TACTICAL LEVEL:

- a. (OMG/VFR/OMS/Aurora Theater AAR) The abilities of responders to conduct **render safe on-site** should be a focus of future training to further build this ability. **There was a lack of balance between life safety priorities of responders and those of victims.** Create **extraction safety teams** so that responders feel safe in extracting victims. P/T/E
- b. (OMS) Refine policies, plans and procedures in accordance with many items in the OMS AAR (some are very tactical, but important and some are larger coordination issues.) P/T/E
- c. (OMG/VFR/OMS/Englewood AS/ Aurora Theater AAR) OMG-Law enforcement was eager and confident when deploying against opposing forces. Teams of the same discipline did well when integrating with other teams of the same type of discipline. **Difficulty was encountered when cross disciplinary operations and tactics were required.** In VFR this was an issue with fire and law enforcement operations. T/E
- d. (OMS/Englewood AS/ Aurora Theater AAR/OBS) There is a **lack of communication between police, fire and command.** There were four areas of concern in which a lack of communication was identified:
 - Areas that had already been searched were being re-searched by secondary teams who did not know that the rooms had already been searched. Although conducting multiple searches of the same area is common practice, the fact that prior search teams were not identifying these areas caused confusion. One reason given for this was the fact that officers did not want to mark (and possibly damage) the doors of the school to identify that the rooms had been searched.
 - The location of victims was not being communicated between law enforcement and fire/EMS.
 - The status of the shooter, upon his capture was not communicated to fire personnel.
 - The presence of an IED.

OBS-RTFs searching for victims without using intelligence or communicating intelligence about the scene including locations of IEDs. Teams operated inconsistently (see full report). T/E
- e. (OMS/Englewood AS/OGL) There is **inconsistent protection of fire/EMS personnel and lack of policy guidance for incidents' involving the need for teams of EMS/law enforcement.** Policies are needed to guide when EMS should go in, how many, with how many protection personnel, and what treatment needs to be done before moving the patient. Englewood AS specific-Some of the law enforcement officers who were tasked with protecting the fire personnel were switching back and forth between searching and protecting. This issue appears to be related to the different tactics used by the different law enforcement agencies. Some departments assign officers to *either* search detail *or* protection detail. Other departments search and protect simultaneously.
 OMS-Different teams (and sometimes same team different discipline) used different terminology, policies, and procedures which caused confusion, resources to be ordered incorrectly, operations to lag, and friendly force encounters. In OGL, only some EMS agencies have personal protective equipment for Response Task Force Operations. T/E
- f. (Vortex) **Conduct regional level training on the roles and responsibilities of search and rescue team assignments and responsibilities** in accordance to local standard operating procedures and the National Urban Search and Rescue standards. Design exercises that require timely assessment, identification of mission objectives and application of command and control of USAR assets in challenging and dynamic scenarios. -Reach agreement on standards to use and implement. P/T/E

- g. (Vortex) **Integrate coroner/medical examiner expertise at all appropriate levels in the Incident Management process**, especially in the initial planning and execution phases of emergency management operations. Any delay in the integration of coroner/medical examiner personnel into emergency management community operations until the discovery of decedents creates potential safety, health and legal issues. When possible, Fatality Management personnel should be on-scene and in charge of fatality documentation and recovery efforts to ensure they can fulfill statutory requirements. Coroners should never be working alone on a site. They should be aware of protocol for reporting live victims, and there should be a coroner representative as part of the Incident Command team. **P/T/E**
- h. (LNF) Emergency notification systems, or reverse-911, are an authorized use of 911 surcharge funds, but local authorities are not required to purchase them. As a result, these systems, which are used to notify residents of emergency situations, **are provided by a number of different vendors, with each system offering different features and limitations**. When a notification must be sent to an **area spanning multiple jurisdictions different notification systems are not integrated**. In addition, emergency notification systems are limited by the decreasing use of land line technology. While traditional land lines are included automatically, residents must proactively register their cellular phone numbers and addresses with the local government in order to receive emergency notifications by cellular phone. The systems are then only able to use the registered address in determining where an individual is located, rather than their physical location at any moment. **P/O**
- i. (OMS/Englewood AS) Although law enforcement can recognize an IED, there were **no IED plans or SOPs to guide their actions after that point**, which caused response delays and confusion. **P/T/E**
- j. (OMS) **Further planning for Casualty Collection Points, Patient Extraction, and joint operations is needed**. **P/T/E**
- k. (CHAOS) Mass notification system was identified by ICP as means to notify the public of evacuations. **It was not clear who is responsible to craft and deliver the message and who is responsible to follow-up with other messages**. **P/T/E**
- l. (OGL) Law enforcement teams must ensure they **drop officers to secure areas** of the active threat scene. This tactic greatly decreases the time it takes to get EMS to patients for any initial treatment and extraction. **P/T/E**
- m. (OMS/OGL) First Responders need more exercise and training exposure to responding to possible IEDs. **T/E**
- n. (RDDs) EMS personnel should continue training to **quickly triage, plan for transportation, and utilize their mass casualty plans**. **T/E**
- o. (Breach) Breaching drill teams psi should not exceed 4 psi and only one team stayed at or below 4 psi this year. **T/E**
- p. (BC) **Better coordination and situational awareness when SAR resources are demobilized or re-assigned**. **P/T/E**

4. EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTERS:

- a. (Vortex) All reimbursement processed to the Federal and State government is based on the supporting documentation. The **documentation must be able to stand the test of audit**, so it is critical that local agencies and governments develop a pre-disaster/emergency standard operating procedures related to the documentation of disaster costs and the guidelines and procedures to file for reimbursement. **P/T**
- b. (Vortex/MF/CS) **Review Memorandums of Understanding, Mutual Aid Agreements and similar documents on an annual basis** to deconflict and validate them within the region. Design exercises to specifically validate and practice the procedures, protocols and processes delineated in cross-jurisdictional and regional MOUs and MAAs. **CS-Mutual aid agreements may need to be signed in advance. Local Emergency Management offices have a plan for mobilizing and managing resources. These resources and mutual aid agreements should be added to those plans.** **P/T/E**
- c. (Vortex) **Require all EOC personnel to complete the FEMA online course G775 “EOC Management and Operations”.** This course describes the role, design, and functions of Emergency Operations Centers and their relationships as components of a multi-agency coordination system. **T**
- d. (Vortex) **A single resource ordering protocol should be standardized across the region.** This process should be clearly agreed upon, documented, and disseminated, with training and exercises to ensure a consistent working process. If “single point ordering” is the only agreed upon method then the receiving end should be scalable to quickly accommodate increases in call density. **P/O/T/E**
- e. (Vortex) **Lack of knowledge as to the types of supplies available outside of an EOC’s** immediate jurisdiction. For example, some EOCs were not aware that Denver Water has significant stores of equipment available in 11 counties and equipment caches. **P/T/E**
- f. (Vortex) **Coordination between jurisdictional EOCs** was, at times, problematic. They are interested in supporting each other but further work is required to institutionalize the processes necessary to provide cross-jurisdictional support. **P/T/E**
- g. (OMG/Vortex/WFE) No established practices defining how to coordinate **resource deployment and prioritization in multiple EOC events. Include Resource mobilization and management process and plans validation** into the next exercise series. This includes the **prioritization of resources** process at a regional and state level. **P/O/T/E**
- h. (VFR) EOC Management should have **backfill for EOC personnel** similar to that in place for the first responders. **P/T/E**
- i. (WFE) Better define and outline a **state level process for resource “just in time statusing”** and add this process to **local resource mobilization and management plans.** **P/T/E**
- j. (WFE) Sustain **financial EOC training** across the Region to ensure knowledge, skills and abilities remain in place during emergency situations. **T/E**
- k. (CHAOS) EOC **Logistics Staff require enhanced training and more frequent drills** on county level resource ordering processes and state resource plans. **T/E**
- l. (BC) There were no **Finance personnel** present and OEM staff has limited purchasing authority on purchase cards. (BC) There were no trained Finance personnel available to fulfill a role in the EOC. Final

cost tracking was done post incident and was delayed. Cost tracking report by IO was delayed due to regular posting dates. **P/O/Eq/T/E**

- m. (BC) **Long term EOC staffing (past a single operational period) is challenging with existing staff.**
P/O/Eq
- n. (BC) EOC Representation: The PD was the only City department that had representation in the EOC, which required PD staff to coordinate all PW and PRG staff, and city-wide communications. Social media presence about city services was limited. Over an extended period of time, in this case 36 hours, places the burden on PD staff to address city service needs. Costs that exceed normal business is not being tracked and documented purposefully. **P/O/Eq**

5. DISPATCH CENTERS:

- a. (OGL) **Dispatch should consider adding prompting questions** to law enforcement into SOPs such as: Who is the Incident Commander? Who is the Tactical Supervisor? Do you want to go to an interoperable channel? Do you want a channel designated for the Rescue Team? This will help ensure these critical elements are in place as the responders are in an intense situation and key questions could help them organize better. **P/T/E**
- b. (WFE) **Define clear trigger points in the delegation of resource ordering between dispatch centers and EOCs.** **P/T/E**
- c. (BC) The Sheriff's Office received many calls for assistance (outside of AdCom) and it became a bit overwhelming. Perhaps setting up a call center to take non-emergency calls (such as stuck vehicles with no medical concern) might take the burden off of AdCom and off of the Sheriff's Office. **P/Eq**
- d. (BC) There were a lot of kick back calls from people who were looking to see what the status was on a loved one that they had already previously called on. Tracking would help provide with better information for these call backs. **P/T/E**

6. SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITY:

- a. (VFR) There are no tactical response assets on Buckley or any plans or protocols for military to integrate with local teams. **Establish protocols that will encourage interoperability with the following:** Communications, Investigations, SWAT Deployment, Bomb Squad Deployment, local police resources, coroner's office, and local fire response. **P/T/E**

C. SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

- 1. (OMG/Vortex/VFR) Recommend that the region **develop policies and procedures for utilizing EMS**ystems to assist in the management of medical surge patients and capacity. There is a need to conduct training and routine short exercises on using this system prior to an emergency. Consider multiple hospitals having a couple very well trained users. **P/T/E**
- 2. (Vortex and VFR) There is a need to **conduct training and routine short exercises on EMS**ystems prior to an emergency. Consider multiple hospitals having a couple very well trained users. **E**

3. (Vortex and VFR) **There is an inadequate Emergency Medical Dispatch Capacity** for large disasters. **P/O/T/E**
4. (Vortex and VFR) **Integrate WebEOC, EMSsystem, geographic information system (GIS) and similar information sharing system and processes into creating and maintaining situational awareness** among jurisdictions, regions and agencies. Deconflict overlap and stream line each to determine their existence in emergency response. **P/O/T/E**
5. (Broken Arrow) WebEOC, as with all electronic resource availability lists, are **only as good as the people who manage the information and process**. This should include process/policies on maintaining current availability status. **P/T**
6. (Vortex) **Emphasize the importance of gathering, producing and distributing information** to all members of the Incident Command and supporting EOC organizations. Ensure this information is exchanged during briefings and debriefings from one shift to another. **P/T/E**

D. PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL

1. HOSPITAL:

- a. (Vortex) Hospitals lack the **knowledge and understanding on resources** available outside of their EOC to make appropriate requests. Lack understanding that requests need to be specific. **P/T/E**
- b. (Vortex and VFR) **Triage was confusing between evacuation triage and MCI triage**. Basic triage training should be provided to all hospital staff members. This will help in situations where hospital staff may not have an appropriately qualified person to do triage. Additionally, standard tagging system (START) should be implemented across NCR jurisdictions. Hospitals do utilize START. It is not effective in an evacuation. Need to investigate a triage standard for evacuations. In VFR it was noted that the transport capability was unclear and not fully explained. Medical staff outlined only the medical response of triage and not the transport component as well. **T**
- c. (DAT) There is no official plan in place for **managing patient allocation and tracking** in an MCI of this magnitude. **P/O/T/E**

2. PUBLIC HEALTH:

- a. (Englewood AS) All **notification and activation communications** with public health should be done through the 24 hour ESF #8 or command center lines. **T**
- b. (Englewood AS) Continued development of **the relationship between behavioral health and victims' advocates** needs to be fostered to ensure more seamless operational response in a law enforcement incident. **T/E**

E. PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. (Vortex) Establish additional lines of **communications** that can be activated during emergencies to provide **family members and the surrounding community** incident specific information. **P/T/E**
2. (CAS/Vortex/VFR) **Ensure all media releases are drafted, coordinated and released, when approved, by the JIC**. Direct that all daily briefings and public information releases originate only from the JIC.

Establish a Joint Information Center/systems during multi-jurisdictional emergencies or whenever emergencies will require wide-dissemination of information, alerts and emergency actions across a region to include nongovernmental and private-sector partners as appropriate (e.g., the Exercise VORTEX scenarios). Fully integrate health and medical PIOs into joint information system.

CAS -It was observed that the **region should investigate forming a joint information center (JIC) process** for cyber security incidents.

P/T/E

3. (Vortex and VFR) **Disseminate prompt, accurate information to the public in languages and formats that take into account hard to reach communities and access and functional needs** and consider reaching out to non-high tech community members and those with access and functional needs within the community. Information was not given to the community about the situation, disseminating vital disaster info (location of shelters, food, water, collapsed areas, etc).
Add to the WebEOC resource list access and functional needs resources.
In VFR it was suggested that the region develop a Crisis Communications Network. P/T/E
4. (Vortex/Englewood AS) Public Information for ESF #8 partners should be **coordinated through an effective joint information system** and integrated into an established system lead by the impacted jurisdiction. P/T/E

F. INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS

1. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

- a. (Vortex) **A debris management/damage assessment plan does not exist.** A clear set of guidelines (standard operating procedures) is lacking for Damage Assessment Teams to follow in the collection of data. P/T/E
- b. (DAW) Some groups were completely **missing damage assessment forms** or even a recovery plan. P/T/E
- c. (DAW) The dynamic between the different stakeholders, namely between **government and NGOs, needs improvement.** Clarification of who has authority and the differences between NGO forms and government forms needs work. P/O/T/E

G. INFO SHARING AND INTEL

1. (VFR) **Information was not properly disseminated to appropriate agencies.** Consider developing additional measures to ensure correct information sharing practices. P/O/T/E
2. (VFR) **Intel sharing between CIAC, APD, and Buckley was almost nonexistent.** Augment the TLO program and ensure the CSPD model is used across the state. Train and exercise with TLOs. P/O/T/E
3. (VFR) **There were breakdowns in information flow.** Research and clarify how information should flow and develop SOP detailing how notifications should be made between agencies. Additionally develop alternative ways to communicate information such as text messages. Utilize Law Enforcement Online when appropriate. P/O/T/E

4. (VFR) **There was a disconnect between intel personnel and detectives at times.** Assemble a working group to address the issue. **P/O/T/E**
5. (VFR) **The CIAC email system of email notification may not be effective method for real-time updates.** (The following information may be outdated, but at the time of the VFR IP this was accurate...In the event of a large incident, CIAC should immediately respond to the scene with a communications capability to work directly with the designated command post.) Additionally many agencies are **not on the distribution list** for the CIAC and this may not make it to everyone who needs to know immediately. Find **a system that can work** to get the right information to the right people (EMSystems was suggested at the time this report was written). **P/O/T/E**
6. (Tri-County TTX) There is an **inconsistent use of information sharing software** across disciplines (EM Resource/WebEOC). No plan was discussed of how to deal with the inconsistent use of information sharing software. **P/O/T/E**
7. (CS/CAS) There is no cybersecurity intelligence sharing plan or system for incidents across jurisdictions within Colorado. **P/T/E**
8. (BC) Public Information and Warning: Information related to food safety during and following a prolonged power outage was not shared in a timely manner nor with a targeted audience, such as restaurants. **P/O**

H. CYBERSECURITY

1. IT DEPARTMENTS/JURISDICTION LEVEL:

- a. (CS) **Policies and training** related to phishing emails and other cyber threats are old and/or outdated within most jurisdictions across the NCR. **P**
- b. (CS) Not all organizations are **staffed** at the same level within IT Departments including **education and certification requirements to ensure cyber security**. Some jurisdictions have more IT professionals with more certifications and education, therefore plans, policies, and level of vigilance are higher in some areas. **P/O/T**
- c. (CS) Jurisdictional **Help Desk personnel** (most) do not **have policies, plans and checklists** that outline procedures for phishing email response levels. **P**
- d. (CS) **Jurisdictional plans (most) do not address notifications and communication during a denial of services incident.** **P/T/E**
- e. (CS/CAS) Jurisdictional and organizational cyber security plans and processes have not been fully developed across the NCR. Most local jurisdictional **plans are not scaled for a large cyber-attack** at this point nor would they be ready for a joint physical and cyber-attack. **P/T/E**
- f. (CS/CAS) **There is no intelligence sharing system related to cyber incidents across jurisdictions within Colorado.** **Also added to Info Sharing as larger concern across disciplines/hazards**
- g. (CS/CAS) **Resources** have not been identified for a response or recovery to a cyber-attack. **Mutual Aid Agreements** are also not in place. All NCR stakeholder organizations participating in the TTX specified the need to have in place memorandums of understanding (MOU) and memorandums of agreements

(MOA) with both private sector partners and local neighboring organizations that have the capability to provide support for cyber incident response, prior to cyber incidents. **P/T/E**

- h. (CS/CAS) Most jurisdictions do not have robust **recovery plans that account for the complexity of a cyber-attack**. **P/T/E**
- i. (CS) Current **plans, policies and resource understanding does not necessarily fit with a cyber-attack in their current state**; however, these same government plans, processes and structures could work for a cyber-attack with some special additions. **P/T/E**
- j. (CFE) Jurisdictional and organizational cyber security **plans and processes have not been fully developed across the NCR**. **P/T/E**
- k. (CFE) **Regional and jurisdictional best practices and system-specific countermeasures were not clearly developed and/or identified for each cyber-attack** (Distributed Denial of Service [DDoS] & Ransomware). **P/O**
- l. (CFE) **Collaboration between partnering agencies was not fully developed, documented effectively, and practiced**. **P/O/T/E**
- m. (CFE) **Proper backup systems were not in place** to continue the use of essential functions in the organization both locally and regionally. **Eq**
- n. (CFE) **Regional and local processes and procedures on State mutual aid was unclear and not demonstrated**. It is unknown if it is possible on how State resources would legally prioritize, catalog, mobilize, track, and implement mutual aid regionally, locally, and privately during a cybersecurity attack. **P/O**
- o. (CFE) The exercise illuminated the issue that there are **no standards in place, both locally and regionally, for determining when reports of cyber issues escalate from simple to complex or from an incident to an emergency**. **P/O**
- p. (CFE) It was unclear what the roles and responsibilities of support organizations are in a **multijurisdictional cyber security attack**. **P/O**
- q. (CFE) There was no structure used/identified region-wide to share information between regional jurisdictions and organizations in an accurate, timely, and direct manner. **P/O/Eq**
- r. (CFE) In several jurisdictions there was no public information officer (PIO) staff established during the FE. **P/O**
- s. (CFE) **Quick and accurate situational awareness both locally and regionally was difficult to obtain**. **P/O/T/E**
- t. (CFE) **Regional assessment reporting form and processes were not completed and returned to CIAC**. **P/O/T/E**
- u. (CFE) There were **no written policies or communication templates used to assist in maintaining and tracking standard awareness of critical information during the cyber security attack**. **P/O/Eq/T/E**

2. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT:

- a. (CS/CAS) **Emergency Management Offices within each jurisdictions should be prepared to assist during and after a cyber-attack as they do for other emergency situations.** Not all emergency management professionals have embraced this option or have explored this philosophy. CAS-No regional system or process has been endorsed on how to gauge cascading effects during a multi-day attack. **P/T/E**
- b. (CS/CAS)**Mutual aid agreements** may need to be signed in advance. Local Emergency Management offices have a **plan for mobilizing and managing resources**. These resources and mutual aid agreements should be added to those plans. **There are no typed resources within local plans for specialized IT support.** **P/T/E**
- c. (CAS) Existing **Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) plans should be revised** to include cyber security incidents. **P/T/E**
- d. (BC) **Transition of EOC staffing created difficulty**, as there were no trained, experienced Adams County staff available to assist with activation. EOC reorganization and staffing is currently underway. **P/O/T/E**
- e. (BC) **There was a significant lack of trained shelter staff to assist**, which resulted in existing staff working long hours and one shelter being unable to open. **P/O/T/E**
- f. (BC) WebEOC was not accessible to all staff who did not maintain individual logins and passwords **P/O/T/E**

3. FATALITY MANAGEMENT

- a. (MSO) **Jurisdictions do not have local plans that address surge operations.** **P**
- b. (MSO) **Coroner/Medical Examiner (C/ME) office expect that internal exams will be conducted on every decedent** involved in a law enforcement related incident where prosecution may occur which may not be feasible for large numbers of fatalities. **P/O/T/E**
- c. (MSO) **Denver Public Health Duty Officer did not properly communicate message to activate the Regional Plan** via SendWordNow and notification to committee members did not occur. **O/T/E**
- d. (MSO) **Players did not know how to conduct a call activating the regional plan using the plan's template agenda.** **O/T/E**
- e. (MSO) **There is a training gap between resource ordering and mobilization.** Players attempted to request resources through outside processes and organizations and not through the jurisdictional Emergency Operations Center (EOC). **P/O/T/E**

I. PLANS DEVELOPMENT

1. EVACUATION PLANNING

- a. (DAT) Local agencies need additional collaboration and established procedures regarding a **large-scale evacuation** during an incident. P/Eq/T/E

2. PRE-PLANNING

- a. (BC) **Identify emergency shelters** along the highways. (BC) Pre-storm regional shelter planning for sheltering/warming center operations, including **strategic pre-positioning of shelter cache supplies**. 4x4 support mechanisms were not pre-planned. **Expand shelter equipment caches in emergency shelter locations**. The Fire District was forced to use one of their stations as a shelter, which is not really designed to shelter people. Pre-identified evacuation center locations may not be sufficient to support sheltering operations caused by a power outage. Homelessness preparedness and sheltering needs to be planned for and information provided to the hospitals. P/O/Eq
- b. (BC) **Facilities should pre-plan for impacts to staffing** (sheltering and transportation) during weather related incidents. **A recommendation is to advise the facilities to arrange transportation to and from work ahead of winter storms**. P/O
- c. (BC) **Healthcare facilities and emergency management should plan around oxygen shortages for future incidents**. P/O/Eq
- d. (BC) **Pre-identify more resources** (generators, cabling, locations with transfer switches, electricians, trade staff etc.) both in-house and contract. P/O/Eq
- e. (BC) Planning Section: **There was no operational planning section to properly plan and document the event, while establishing distinct operational periods**. P/O/Eq/T/E

J. MASS CARE

1. TRAINING

- a. (BC) Include **School District transportation personnel in EOC trainings and activations**. P/O/T/E
- b. (BC) **Identify and train more personnel for EOC ESF 6 desk**. P/O/T/E
- c. (BC) There is a need to **increase training and provide clarification of roles for Senior Leadership and EOC staff during disaster response**. (County Manager's Office) P/O/T/E
- d. (BC) **Provide preparedness education to the community and business partners regarding their roles and impact on disasters**. (County Manager's Office) P/O/T/E

- e. (BC) The shelter was extremely short staffed. **Additional trained staff, and additional training for existing staff, is needed.** P/O/T/E
- f. (BC) **Response identified a gap in ICS training and understanding.** P/O/T/E
- g. (BC) Eleven Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) members checked in and 6 indicated ability to deploy; prepared to support 4 sites with radios, but **specific details including site contacts, tasks, and timing were undefined.** P/O/Eq/T/E

2. COMMUNICATIONS/NOTIFICATIONS

- a. (BC) Court Cancellation: **No arrangements were made by Courts to close the court and notify citizens arriving for court.** The Police Department was at minimum professional staffing levels and were deviated from their duties to manage the crowds of people assembled in the lobby for court. P/O
- b. (BC) Civic Center Closure during Normal Business Hours: **No arrangements were made by any other City department to secure the facility.** There are limited capabilities for citizens to get emergency assistance from outside the Civic Center. P/O
- c. (BC) External Communications: Aside for PD resources, **there was no activation of an external communications plan or personnel to ensure someone is focusing on timely and accurate information reaching the public, the media and stakeholders.** P/O/T/E
- d. (BC) Internal Communications Protocol: **The use of the system in preparation for or the unplanned activation of a major event is not adequate to notify and/or recall key personnel with the city organization.** P/O/T/E
- e. (BC) Communications issues between on-scene personnel, Police Branch, and Evacuation Branch; **PD training needed on EOC functions and the required partnership.** P/T/E
- f. (BC) **There is a need to increase coordination with DIA regarding release of their employees,** which caused significant challenges, as many of them got stuck on their way out. P/O/T

3. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

- a. (BC) **There was some confusion and competition for resources,** such as with Aurora and the Snow Cat, especially after Aurora EOC closed, which caused some resources to seemingly disappear. The County had to rely on other agencies for important resources which caused a significant delay in getting the resources. P/O/Eq/T/E
- b. (BC) **Cache sustainment, maintenance, and availability.** P/O/Eq
- c. (BC) Due to location of equipment the winter operations team did not have everything available in staging. There was a delay in SAR missions while the team dealt with equipment prep. P/O/Eq/T/E
- d. (BC) **The reimbursement processes for supplies used at shelters needs to be clarified.** P/O

- e. (BC) **No emergency power capabilities** at EVAC or Brighton Recreation Center. Power outages are prevalent during winter storms and identifying resources to aid access and functional needs populations during power outages is advised. Especially senior independent living housing, as there are no CMS requirements to help the senior citizens during power outages. One idea is to provide the Independent Senior Living facilities with a brochure that is available from Jefferson County Human Services for Power Outages. P/Eq/T/E

4. STAFFING

- a. (BC) **Public Works Staffing and Equipment:** Public Works, aside from the snow plow crews, did not have any staff available to assist or deliver barricades, or assist with any other street related issues. P/O/Eq
- b. (BC) PD Staffing Assessment: Aside from exempt staff, **there was no assessment in preparation for the storm to modify schedules, implement recalls and modify personnel assignments to accommodate citywide/PD needs, under emergency management rights.** P/O/Eq/T/E
- c. (BC) Demobilization: The demobilization process did not include activities to demobilize staff, partners, and DOC, such as EOI alerts to impacted partners and forwarding DOC phones to monitored phone lines. No Shelter Demobilization checklist so it was unclear as to whose responsibility it was to pack up resources after shelter was closed. P/O/T/E